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Data Science as Political Action: Grounding Data Science in
a Politics of Justice
Ben Green*
Abstract: In response to public scrutiny of data-driven algorithms, the field of data science has adopted ethics
training and principles. Although ethics can help data scientists reflect on certain normative aspects of their
work, such efforts are ill-equipped to generate a data science that avoids social harms and promotes social
justice. In this article, I argue that data science must embrace a political orientation. Data scientists must
recognize themselves as political actors engaged in normative constructions of society and evaluate their work
according to its downstream impacts on people’s lives. I first articulate why data scientists must recognize
themselves as political actors. In this section, I respond to three arguments that data scientists commonly invoke
when challenged to take political positions regarding their work. In confronting these arguments, I describe
why attempting to remain apolitical is itself a political stance—a fundamentally conservative one—and why
data science’s attempts to promote “social good” dangerously rely on unarticulated and incrementalist political
assumptions. I then propose a framework for how data science can evolve toward a deliberative and rigorous
politics of social justice. I conceptualize the process of developing a politically engaged data science as a
sequence of four stages. Pursuing these new approaches will empower data scientists with new methods for
thoughtfully and rigorously contributing to social justice.
Key words: data science; ethics; politics; social justice; social change; social good; pedagogy
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sensitive and intimate information about people[10−13].
Many individuals and organizations responded to
these controversies by advocating for a focus on ethics
in computing training and practice[14]. Universities have
created new courses that train students to consider the
ethical implications of computer science[15−18]; one
crowdsourced list includes more than 300 such
classes[19]. Former US Chief Data Scientist D. J. Patil has
argued that data scientists need a code of ethics[20]. The
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), the
world’s largest educational and scientific computing
society, updated its Code of Ethics and Professional
Conduct in 2018 for the first time since 1992[21]. The
broad motivation behind these efforts is the assumption
that, if only data scientists were more attuned to the
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① Throughout this article, “data science” encompasses the use of
computational methods (including artificial intelligence and machine
learning) to derive patterns from data in order to make predictions about
the future. In this sense, a data scientist is anyone who works with data
and algorithms in these settings. My particular focus is on the application
of data science methods to social and political contexts.

1

Introduction

The field of data science has entered a period of
reflection and reevaluation.① Alongside its rapid growth
in both size and stature in recent years, data science has
become beset by controversies and scrutiny. Machine
learning algorithms that guide decisions in areas such as
hiring, healthcare, criminal sentencing, and welfare are
often biased, inscrutable, and proprietary[1−6].
Algorithms that drive social media feeds manipulate
people’s emotions[7], spread misinformation[8], and
amplify political extremism[9]. Facilitating these and
other algorithms are massive datasets, often gained
illicitly or without meaningful consent, that reveal
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ethical implications of their work, many harms
associated with data science could be avoided[14].
Although emphasizing ethics is an important step in
data science’s development toward greater socially
responsibility, it is an insufficient response to the broad
issues of social justice that are implicated by data
science.② As described in the introductory article for this
special issue, technology ethics as applied in practice
suffers from four significant limitations[14]. First,
technology ethics principles are abstract and lack
mechanisms to ensure that engineers follow ethical
principles. Second, technology ethics has a myopic
focus on individual engineers and on technology design,
overlooking the structural sources of technological
harms. Third, technology ethics is subsumed into
corporate logics and practices rather than substantively
altering behavior. All told, the rise of technology ethics
often reflects a practice dubbed “ethics-washing”: tech
companies deploying the language of ethics to resist
more structural reforms that would curb their power and
profits.
Thus, while ethics provides useful frameworks to help
data scientists reflect on their practice and the impacts
of their work, these approaches are insufficient for
generating a data science that avoids social harms and
that promotes social justice. The normative
responsibilities of data scientists cannot be managed
through to a narrow professional ethics that lacks
normative weight and supposes that, with some
reflection and a commitment to best practices, data
scientists will make the “right” decisions that lead to
“good” technology. Instead of relying on vague moral
principles that obscure the structural drivers of injustice,
data scientists must engage in politics: the process of
negotiating between competing perspectives, values,
and goals.
In other words, we must recognize data science as a
form of political action. Data scientists must recognize
themselves as political actors engaged in normative
constructions of society. In turn, data scientists must
evaluate their efforts according to the downstream
impacts on people’s lives.
By politics and political, I do not refer directly to
② In Black Feminist Thought, Patricia Hill Collins defines a “social
justice project” as “an organized, long-term effort to eliminate oppression
and empower individuals and groups within a just society”. Oppression,
she writes, is “an unjust situation where, systematically and over a long
period of time, one group denies another group access to the resources of
society”[22].
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partisan or electoral debates about specific parties and
candidates. Instead, I invoke these terms in a broader
sense that transcends activity directly pertaining to the
government, its laws, and its representatives. Two
aspects of politics are paramount. First, politics is
everywhere in the social world. As defined by politics
professor Adrian Leftwich, “politics is at the heart of all
collective social activity, formal and informal, public
and private, in all human groups, institutions, and
societies”[23]. Second, politics has a broad reach.
Political scientist Harold Lasswell describes politics as
“who gets what, when, how”[24]. The “what” here could
mean many things: money, goods, status, influence,
respect, rights, and so on. Understood in these terms,
politics comprises any activities that affect or make
claims about the who, what, when, and how in social
groups, both small and large.
Data scientists are political actors in that they play an
increasingly powerful role in determining the
distribution of rights, status, and goods across many
social contexts. As data scientists develop tools that
inform important social and political decisions—who
receives a job offer, what news people see, where police
patrols—they shape social outcomes around the world.
Data scientists are some of today’s most powerful (and
obscured) political actors, structuring how institutions
conceive of problems and make decisions.
This article will justify and develop the notion of data
science as political action. My argument raises two
questions: (1) Why must data scientists recognize
themselves as political actors? and (2) How can data
scientists ground their practice in a politics of social
justice? The two primary sections of this article will take
up these questions in turn.
My aim is to support data science toward playing a
more productive role in promoting equity and social
justice. I do not intend to stop data science in its tracks,
critique individual practitioners, or discourage data
scientists from working on social problems. The path
ahead does not require data scientists to abandon their
technical expertise, but it does require data scientists to
expand their notions of what problems to work on and
how to engage with society. This process may involve
an uncomfortable period of change. But I am confident
that exciting new areas for research and practice will
emerge, producing a field that can contribute to a more
egalitarian and just society.
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2

Why Must Data Scientists Recognize
Themselves as Political Actors?

The first part of this article will attempt to answer this
question in the form of a dialogue with a wellintentioned skeptic. I will respond to three arguments
that are commonly invoked by data scientists when they
are challenged to take political stances regarding their
work. These arguments have been expressed in a variety
of public and private settings and will be familiar to
anyone who has engaged in discussions about the social
responsibilities of data scientists.
These are by no means the only arguments proffered
in this larger debate, nor do they represent any sort of
unified position among data scientists. In practice,
computer scientists are “diverse and ambivalent
characters”[25] who engage in “nuanced, contextualized,
and reflexive practices”[26]. Some computer science
subfields (such as CSCW[27]) have long histories of
engaging with sociotechnical practices and normative
implications, while others (such as the ACM Conference
on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT))
are actively developing such approaches. Nonetheless,
in my experience, the three positions considered here are
the most common and compelling arguments made
against a politically oriented data science. Any
promotion of a more politically engaged data science
must contend with them.
2.1

Argument 1: “I am just an engineer”

This first argument represents a common attitude among
engineers. In this view, although engineers develop new
tools, their work does not determine how a tool will be
used. Artifacts are seen as neutral objects that lack any
inherent normative character and that can simply be used
in good or bad ways. By this logic, engineers bear no
responsibility for the impacts of their creations.
It is common for data scientists to argue that the
impacts of technology are unknowable. As one computer
scientist who faced criticism for developing facial
recognition software argued in defense of his work,
“Anything can be used for good. Anything can be used
for bad”[28]. Similarly, during a 2019 NeurIPS workshop,
in which two panelists highlighted the harmful impacts
of AI on communities of color, several computer
scientists in the audience countered that it is impossible
to know what the impacts of research will be or to
prevent others from misusing products[29].
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By articulating their limited role as neutral researchers,
data scientists provide themselves with an excuse to
abdicate responsibility for the social and political
impacts of their work. When a paper that used neural
networks to classify crimes as gang-related was
challenged for its potentially harmful effects on minority
communities, a senior author on the paper deflected
responsibility by arguing, “It’s basic research”[30].
Although it is common for engineers to see themselves
as separate from politics, many scholars have thoroughly
articulated how technology embeds politics and shapes
social outcomes. As political theorist Langdon Winner
describes, “technological innovations are similar to
legislative acts or political foundings that establish a
framework for public order that will endure over many
generations. For that reason, the same careful attention
one would give to the rules, roles, and relationships of
politics must also be given to such things as the building
of highways, the creation of television networks, and the
tailoring of seemingly insignificant features on new
machines. The issues that divide or unite people in
society are settled not only in the institutions and
practices of politics proper, but also, and less obviously,
in tangible arrangements of steel and concrete, wires and
semiconductors, and nuts and bolts”[31].
Even though technology does not conform to
conventional notions of politics, it often shapes society
in much the same way as laws, elections, and judicial
opinions. In this sense, “the scientific workplace
functions as a key site for the production of social and
political order”[32]. Thus, as with many other types of
scientists, data scientists possess “a source of fresh
power that escapes the routine and easy definition of a
stated political power”[33].
There are many examples of engineers developing and
deploying technologies that, by structuring behavior and
shifting power, shape aspects of society. As one example,
Winner famously (and controversially[34, 35]) describes
how Robert Moses designed the bridges over the
parkways on Long Island, New York with low
overpasses[31]. Moses purportedly did this to prevent
buses (which predominantly carried lower-class and nonwhite urban residents) from navigating these parkways
and accessing the parks to which they led.
Another historical example similarly demonstrates
how the design of traffic technologies can have social
and political ramifications. As historian Peter Norton
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describes, when automobiles were introduced onto city
streets in the 1920s, they created chaos and conflict in the
existing social order[36]. Many cities turned to traffic
engineers as “disinterested experts” whose scientific
methods could provide a neutral and optimal solution.
But the engineers’ solution contained unexamined
assumptions and values, namely, that “traffic efficiency
worked for the benefit of all”. As traffic engineers
changed the timings of traffic signals to enable cars to
flow freely, their so-called solution “helped to redefine
streets as motor thoroughfares where pedestrians did not
belong”. These actions by traffic engineers helped shape
the next several decades of automobile-focused urban
development in US cities.
Although these particular outcomes could be chalked
up to unthoughtful design, any decisions that the traffic
engineers made would have had some such impact:
determining how to time streetlights requires judgments
about what outcomes and whose interests to prioritize.
Whatever they and the public may have believed, traffic
engineers were never “just” engineers optimizing
society “for the benefit of all”. Instead, they were
engaged in the process—via formulas and signal
timings—of defining which street uses should be
supported and which should be constrained. The traffic
engineers may not have decreed by law that streets were
for cars, but their technological intervention assured this
outcome by other means.
Data scientists today risk repeating this pattern of
designing tools with inherently political characters yet
largely overlooking their own agency and responsibility.
By imagining an artificially limited role for themselves,
engineers create an environment of scientific
development that requires few moral or political
responsibilities. But this conception of engineering has
always been a mirage. Developing any technology
contributes to the particular “social contract implied by
building that technological system in a particular
form”[31].
Of course, we must also resist placing too much
responsibility on data scientists. The point is not that, if
only they recognized their social impacts, engineers
could themselves solve social issues. Technology is at
best just one tool among many for addressing complex
social problems[37]. Nor should we uncritically accept
the social influence that data scientists have. Having
unelected and unaccountable technical experts make
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core decisions about governance away from the public
eye imperils essential notions of how a democratic
society ought to function. As Science, Technology, and
Society (STS) scholar Sheila Jasanoff argues, “The very
meaning of democracy increasingly hinges on
negotiating the limits of the expert’s power in relation to
that of the publics served by technology”[38].
Nonetheless, the design and implementation of
technology does rely, at some level, on trained
practitioners. This raises several questions that animate
the rest of this article. What responsibilities should data
scientists bear? How must data scientists
reconceptualize their scientific and societal roles in light
of these responsibilities?
2.2

Argument 2: “Our job is not to take political
stances”

Data scientists adhering to this second argument likely
accept the response to Argument 1 but feel stuck, unsure
how to appropriately act as more than “just” an engineer.
“Sure, I am developing tools that impact people’s lives”,
they may acknowledge, before asking, “But is not the
best thing to just be as neutral as possible?”
Although it is understandable how data scientists
come to this position, their desire for neutrality suffers
from two important failings. First, neutrality is an
unachievable goal, as it is impossible to engage in
science or politics without being influenced by one’s
background, values, and interests. Second, striving to be
neutral is not itself a politically neutral position. Instead,
it is a fundamentally conservative one.③
An ethos of objectivity has long been prevalent among
scientists. Since the nineteenth century, objectivity has
evolved into a set of widespread ethical and normative
scientific practices. Conducting good science—and
being a good scientist—meant suppressing one’s own
perspective so that it would not contaminate the
interpretations of observations[39].
Yet this conception of science was always rife with
contradictions and oversights. Knowledge is shaped and
bounded by the social contexts that generated it. This
insight forms the backbone of standpoint theory, which
articulates that “nothing in science can be protected from
cultural influence—not its methods, its research
technologies, its conceptions of nature’s fundamental
ordering principles, its other concepts, metaphors,
③ I use conservative here in the sense of maintaining the status quo
rather than in relation to any specific political party or movement.
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models, narrative structures, or even formal
languages”[40]. Although scientific standards of
objectivity account for certain kinds of individual
subjectivity, they are too narrowly construed: “methods
for maximizing objectivism have no way of detecting
values, interests, discursive resources, and ways of
organizing the production of knowledge that first
constitute scientific problems, and then select central
concepts, hypotheses to be tested, and research
designs”[40].
These processes make the supposedly objective
scientific “gaze from nowhere” nothing more than “an
illusion”[41]. Every aspect of science is imbued with the
characteristics and interests of those who produce it.
This does not invalidate every scientific finding as
arbitrary, but points to science’s contingency and
reliance on its practitioners: all research and engineering
are developed within particular institutions and cultures
and with particular problems and purposes in mind.
Just as it is impossible to conduct science in any truly
neutral way, there is no such thing as a neutral (or
apolitical) approach to politics. As philosopher Roberto
Unger writes, political neutrality is an “illusory and
ultimately idolatrous goal” because “no set of practices
and institutions can be neutral among conceptions of the
good”[42].
Instead of being neutral and apolitical, attempts to be
neutral and apolitical embody an implicitly conservative
politics. Because neutrality does not mean value-free—
it means acquiescence to dominant social and political
values, freezing the status quo in place. Neutrality may
appear to be apolitical, but that is only because the status
quo is taken as a neutral default. Anything that
challenges the status quo—which efforts to promote
social justice must do by definition—will therefore be
seen as political. But efforts for reform are no more
political than efforts to resist reform or even the choice
simply to not act, both of which preserve existing
systems.
Although surely not the intent of every scientist and
engineer who strives for neutrality, broad cultural
conceptions of science as neutral entrench the
perspectives of dominant social groups, who are the only
ones entitled to legitimate claims of neutrality. For
example, many scholars have noted that neutrality is
defined by a masculine perspective, making it
impossible for women to be seen as objective or for
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neutral positions to consider female standpoints[40, 43−45].
The voices of Black women are particularly subjugated
as partisan and anecdotal[22]. Because of these
perceptions, when people from marginalized groups
critique scientific findings, they are cast off as irrational,
political, and representing a particular perspective[41]. In
contrast, the practices of science and the perspectives of
the dominant groups that uphold it are rarely considered
to suffer from the same maladies.
Data science exists on this political landscape.
Whether articulated by their developers or not, machine
learning systems already embed political stances.
Overlooking this reality merely allows these political
judgments to pass without scrutiny, in turn granting data
science systems with more credence and legitimacy than
they deserve.
Predictive policing algorithms offer a particularly
pointed example of how striving to remain neutral
entrenches and legitimize existing political conditions.
The issue is not simply that the training data behind
predictive policing algorithms are biased due to a history
of overenforcement in minority neighborhoods. In
addition, our very definitions of crime and how to
address it are the product of racist and classist historical
processes. Dating back to the eras of slavery and
reconstruction, cultural associations of Black men with
criminality have justified extensive police forces with
broad powers[46]. The War on Drugs, often identified as
a significant cause of mass incarceration, emerged out
of an explicit agenda by the Nixon administration to
target people of color[47].④ Meanwhile, crimes like wage
theft are systemically underenforced by police and do
not even register as relevant to conversations about
predictive policing.⑤
Moreover, predictive policing rests on a model of
policing that is itself unjust. Predictive policing software
could exist only in a society that deploys vast punitive
resources to prevent social disorder, following “broken
④ As Nixon’s special counsel John Ehrlichman explained years later,
“We knew we could not make it illegal to be either against the war or
black. But by getting the public to associate the hippies with marijuana
and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing both heavily, we could
disrupt those communities. We could arrest their leaders, raid their homes,
break up their meetings, and vilify them night after night on the evening
news. Did we know we were lying about the drugs? Of course we did.”[48]
⑤ Wage theft occurs when employers deny their employees the wages
or benefits to which they are legally entitled (e.g., not paying employees
for overtime work). Wage theft steals more value than all other kinds of
theft (such as burglaries) combined, typically carried out by business
owners against low-income workers[49].
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windows” tactics. Policing has always been far from
neutral: “the basic nature of the law and the police, since
its earliest origins, is to be a tool for managing inequality
and maintaining the status quo”[50]. The issues with
policing are not flaws of training or methods or “bad
apple” officers, but are endemic to policing itself[46, 50].
Against this backdrop, choosing to develop predictive
policing algorithms is not neutral. Accepting common
definitions of crime and how to address it may seem to
allow data scientists to remove themselves from politics,
but instead upholds historical politics of social hierarchy.
Although predictive policing represents a notably
salient example of how data science cannot be neutral,
the same could be said of all applied data science. Biased
data are certainly one piece of the story, but so are
existing social and political conditions, definitions and
classifications of social problems, and the set of
institutions that respond to those problems. None of
these factors are neutral and removed from politics. And
while data scientists are of course not responsible for
creating these aspects of society, they are responsible for
choosing how to interact with them. Neutrality in the
face of injustice only reinforces that injustice. When
engaging with aspects of the world steeped in history and
politics, in other words, it is impossible for data scientists
to not take political stances.
I do not mean to suggest that every data scientist
should share a singular political vision—that would be
wildly unrealistic. It is precisely because the field (and
world) hosts a diversity of normative perspectives that
we must surface political debates and recognize the role
they play in shaping data science practice. Nor is my
argument meant to suggest that articulating one’s
political commitments is a simple task. Normative ideals
can be complex and conflicting, and one’s own
principles can evolve over time. Data scientists need not
have precise answers about every political question.
However, they must act in light of articulated principles
and grapple with the uncertainty that surrounds these
ideals.
2.3

Argument 3: “We should not let the perfect be
the enemy of the good”

Following the responses to Arguments 1 and 2, data
scientists asserting this third argument likely
acknowledge that their creations will unavoidably have
social impacts and that neutrality is not possible. Yet still

holding out against a thorough political engagement,
they fall back on a seemingly pragmatic position:
because data science tools can improve society in
incremental but important ways, we should support their
development rather than argue about what a perfect
solution might be.
Despite being the most sophisticated of the three
arguments, this position suffers from several
underdeveloped principles. First, data science lacks
robust theories regarding what “perfect” and “good”
actually entail. As a result, the field typically adopts a
superficial approach to reform that involves making
vague (almost tautological) claims about what social
conditions are desirable. Second, this argument fails to
articulate how to evaluate or navigate the relationship
between the perfect and the good. Efforts to promote
social good thus tend to take for granted that technologycentric incremental reform is an appropriate strategy for
social progress. Yet, considered from a perspective of
substantive equality and anti-oppression, many data
science efforts to do good are not, in fact, consistently
doing good.
2.3.1 Data science lacks a thorough definition of
“social good”
Across the broad world of data science, from academic
institutes to conferences to companies to volunteer
organizations, “social good” (or just “good”) has
become a popular term. Numerous universities across
the United States and Europe have hosted the Data
Science for Social Good Summer Fellowship.⑥ Several
major computer science conferences have hosted AI for
Social Good workshops,⑦ and in 2014 the theme of the
entire ACM SIGKDD Conference on Knowledge
Discovery and Data Mining (KDD) was “Data Mining
for Social Good”.⑧ Since 2014, the company
Bloomberg has hosted an annual Data for Good
Exchange.⑨ The non-profit Delta Analytics strives to
promote “Data-driven solutions for social good”.⑩
While this energy to do good among the data science
community is both commendable and exciting, the field
has not developed (nor even much debated) any working
definitions of the term “social good” to guide its efforts.
Instead, the field seems to operate on a “know it when
⑥ http://www.dssgfellowship.org
⑦ https: //aiforsocialgood.github.io/
⑧ https: //www.kdd.org/kdd2014/
⑨ https: //www.bloomberg.com/company/d4gx/
⑩ http://www.deltanalytics.org
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you see it” approach, relying on rough proxies such as
crime = bad, poverty = bad, and so on. The term’s lack
of precision prompted one of Delta Analytics’ founders
to write that “‘data for good’ has become an arbitrary
term to the detriment of the goals of the movement”[51].
The notable exception is Mechanism Design for Social
Good (MD4SG), which articulates a clear research
agenda “to improve access to opportunity, especially for
communities of individuals for whom opportunities
have historically been limited”[52].
In fact, the term “social good” lacks a thorough
definition even beyond the realm of data science. It is not
defined in dictionaries like Merriam-Webster, the
Oxford English Dictionary, and Dictionary.com, nor
does it have a page on Wikipedia.⑪ To find a definition
one must look to the financial education website
Investopedia, which defines social good as “something
that benefits the largest number of people in the largest
possible way, such as clean air, clean water, healthcares,
and literacy”[54]. There is, of course, extensive literature
(spanning philosophy, STS, and other fields) that
considers what is socially desirable, yet data science
efforts to promote “social good” rarely reference this
literature.
This lack of definition leads to “data science for social
good” projects that span a wide range of conflicting
political orientations. For example, some work under the
“social good” umbrella is explicitly developed to
enhance police accountability and promote non-punitive
alternatives to incarceration[55, 56]. In contrast, other
work under the “social good” label aims to enhance
police operations. One such paper aimed to classify gang
crimes in Los Angeles[30, 57]. This project involved
taking for granted the legitimacy of the Los Angeles
Police Department’s gang data—a notoriously biased
type of data[58] from a police department that has a long
history of abusing minorities in the name of gang
suppression[50]. That such politically disparate and
conflicting work could be similarly characterized as
“social good” should prompt a reconsideration of the
core terms and principles. When the term encompasses
everything, it means nothing.
The point is not that there exists a single optimal
definition of “social good”, nor that every data scientist
should agree on one set of principles. Instead, there is a
⑪ Searching Wikipedia for “social good” automatically redirects to the
page for “common good”, a term similarly undefined in data science
parlance[53].
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multiplicity of perspectives that must be openly
acknowledged to surface debates about what “good”
actually entails. Currently, however, the field lacks the
language and perspective to sufficiently evaluate and
debate differing visions of what is “good”. By framing
their notions of “good” in such vague and undefined
terms, data scientists get to have their cake and eat it too:
they can receive praise and publications based on broad
claims about solving social challenges, while avoiding
substantive engagement with social and political
impacts.
Most dangerously, data science’s vague framing of
social good allows those already in power to present their
normative judgments about what is “good” as neutral
facts that are difficult to challenge. As discussed in
Section 2.2, neutrality is an impossible goal and attempts
to be neutral tend to reinforce the status quo. Thus, if the
field does not openly debate definitions of “perfect” and
“good”, the assumptions and values of dominant groups
will tend to win out. Projects that purport to enhance
social good but fail to reflexively engage with the
political context are likely to reproduce the exact forms
of social oppression that many working towards “social
good” seek to dismantle.⑫
2.3.2 Pursuing an incremental “good” can reinforce
oppression
Even if data scientists acknowledge that “social good” is
often poorly defined, they may still adhere to the
argument that “we should not let the perfect be the enemy
of the good”. “After all”, they might say, “is not some
solution, however imperfect, better than nothing?” As
one paper asserts, “we should not delay solutions over
concerns of optimal” outcomes[60].
At this point the second failure of Argument 3
becomes clear: it tells us nothing about the relationship
between the perfect and the good. Data science has thus
far not developed any rigorous methodology for
considering the relationship between algorithmic
interventions and social impacts. Although data
scientists generally acknowledge that data science
cannot provide perfect solutions to social problems, the
field typically takes for granted that incremental reforms
using data science contribute to the “social good”. On
this logic, we should applaud any attempts to alleviate
issues such as crime, poverty, and discrimination.
Meanwhile, because “the perfect” represents an
⑫ Reflexivity refers to the practice of treating one’s own scientific
inquiry as a subject of analysis[59].
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unrealizable utopia we should not waste time and energy
debating the ideal solution.
Although efforts to promote “social good” using data
science can be productive,⑬ pursuing such applications
without a rigorous theory of social change can lead to
harmful consequences. A reform that seems desirable
from a narrow perspective focused on immediate
improvements can be undesirable from a broader
perspective focused on long-term, structural reforms.
Understood in these terms, the dichotomy between the
idealized “perfect” and the incremental “good” is a false
one: articulating visions of an ideal society is an essential
step for developing and evaluating incremental reforms.
In order to rigorously conceive of and compare potential
incremental reforms, we must first debate and refine our
conceptions of the society we want to create; following
those ideals, we can then evaluate whether potential
incremental reforms push society in the desired direction.
Because there is a multiplicity of imagined “perfects”,
which in turn suggest an even larger multiplicity of
incremental “goods”, reforms must be evaluated based
on what type of society they promote in both the short
and long term. In other words, rather than treating any
incremental reform as desirable, data scientists must
recognize that different incremental reforms can push
society down drastically different paths.
When attempting to achieve reform, an essential task
is to evaluate the relationship between incremental
changes and long-term agendas for a more just society.
As social philosopher André Gorz proposes, we must
distinguish between “reformist reforms” and “nonreformist reforms”[61]. Gorz explains, “A reformist
reform is one which subordinates its objectives to the
criteria of rationality and practicability of a given system
and policy.” In contrast, a non-reformist reform “is
conceived not in terms of what is possible within the
framework of a given system and administration, but in
view of what should be made possible in terms of human
needs and demands”.
Reformist and non-reformist reforms are both
categories of incremental reform, but they are conceived
through distinct processes. Reformist reformers start
within existing systems, looking for ways to improve
them. In contrast, non-reformist reformers start beyond
existing systems, looking for ways to achieve
⑬ See e.g., the set of projects completed by the Data Science for Social
Good Fellowship: http://www.dssgfellowship.org/projects/.
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emancipatory social conditions. Because of the distinct
ways that these two types of reforms are conceived, the
pursuit of one versus the other can lead to widely
divergent social and political outcomes.
The solutions proposed by data scientists are almost
entirely reformist reforms. The standard logic of data
science—grounded in accuracy and efficiency—tends
toward accepting and working within the parameters of
existing systems. Data science interventions are
therefore typically proposed to improve the performance
of a system rather than to substantively alter it. And
while these types of reforms have value under certain
conditions, such an ethos of reformist reforms is
unequipped to identify and pursue the larger changes that
are necessary across many institutions. This approach
may even serve to entrench and legitimize the status quo.
From the standpoint of existing systems, it is impossible
to imagine alternative ways of structuring
society—when reform is conceived in this way, “only
the most narrow parameters of change are possible and
allowable”[62].
In this sense, data science’s dominant strategy of
pursuing a reformist, incremental good resembles a
greedy algorithm: at every point in time, the strategy is
to make immediate improvements in the local vicinity
of the status quo. Although a greedy strategy can be
useful for simple problems, it is unreliable in complex
search spaces: we may quickly find a local maximum but
will never reach a further-afield terrain of far better
solutions. Moves that are immediately beneficial can be
counterproductive for finding the global optimum.
Similarly, although reformist reforms can lead to certain
improvements, a strategy limited to reformist reforms
cannot guide robust responses to complex political
problems. Reforms that appear desirable within the
narrow scope of a reformist strategy can be
counterproductive for achieving structural reforms.
Even though the optimal political solution is rarely
achievable (and is often subject to significant debate), it
is necessary to fully characterize the space of possible
reforms and to evaluate how reliably different
approaches can generate more egalitarian outcomes.
The US criminal justice system, a domain where data
scientists are increasingly striving to do good,
exemplifies the limits of a reformist mindset. Because
criminal justice reform can be “superficial and
deceptive”[63], it is necessary to couch reform efforts

Ben Green: Data Science as Political Action: Grounding Data Science in a Politics of Justice

within a broader vision of long-term, non-reformist
change. This is the approach taken by the movement for
police and prison abolition. Notably, prison abolitionists
object to reforms that “render criminal law
administration more humane, but fail to substitute
alternative institutions or approaches to realize social
order maintenance goals”[64]. Instead, abolitionists
pursue only reforms that reduce or replace carceral
responses to social disorder.
In contrast with this abolitionist ethos, most data
science efforts to contribute “good” are grounded in the
existing practices of the criminal justice system. A
notable example is pretrial risk assessments. Even if
they lead to incremental improvements, these tools
legitimize policies that drive racial injustice and mass
incarceration[65]. Meanwhile, an entirely separate
incremental reform—an abolitionist and non-reformist
(and non-technological) one—is possible: ending cash
bail and pretrial detention. Recent surveys show public
support for such reforms[66, 67].
Adopting pretrial risk assessments and abolishing
pretrial detention appear to respond to the same
problems, suggesting that these two reforms are aligned.
However, these reforms derive from conflicting visions
of the “perfect”. Reformers supporting risk assessments
accept pretrial detention as part of criminal justice
system, aiming merely to improve the means by which
people are selected for pretrial detention. Meanwhile,
reformers aiming to abolishing pretrial detention reject
pretrial detention, aiming to abolish the practice
altogether. In other words, the debate about risk
assessments hinges on political questions about how the
criminal justice system should be structured. It is only
by articulating our imagined perfects that we can even
recognize the underlying tension between these two
incremental reforms, let alone properly debate which
one to pursue.
The point is not that data science is incapable of
improving society. However, data science interventions
must be evaluated against alternative reforms as just one
of many options, rather than compared merely against
the status quo as the only possible reform. There should
not a default presumption that machine learning
provides an appropriate reform for every problem.
In sum, attempts by data scientists to avoid politics
overlook technology’s social impacts, privilege the
status quo, and narrow the range of possible reforms. The
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field of data science will be unable to meaningfully
advance social justice without accepting itself as
political. The question that remains is how it can do so.

3

How Can Data Scientists Ground Their
Practice in Politics?

The first part of this article argued that data scientists
must recognize themselves as political actors. Yet
several questions remain: What would it look like for
data science to be explicitly grounded in a politics of
social justice? How might the field evolve toward this
end?
I conceptualize the process of incorporating politics
into data science as following four stages, with reforms
at both the individual and the institutional/cultural levels.
Stage 1 (Interest) involves data scientists becoming
interested in working directly on addressing social issues.
In Stage 2 (Reflection), the data scientists involved in
that work come to recognize the politics that underlie
these issues and their attempts to address them.⑭ This
leads to Stage 3 (Applications), in which data scientists
direct the methods at their disposal toward new problems.
Finally, Stage 4 (Practice) involves the long-term project
of developing new methods and structures that orient
data science around a politics of social justice.
I discuss each stage in more detail below. While not
every person or project will follow this precise trajectory,
it presents a possible path for data scientists to
incorporate politics into their practice. In fact, many data
scientists already are following some version of these
stages toward a politically informed data science.
3.1

Stage 1: Interest

The first step toward infusing a deliberate politics into
data science is for data scientists to orient their work
around addressing social issues. Such efforts are already
well underway, from “data for good” programs to civic
technology groups to the growing numbers of data
scientists working in governments and non-profits.
Although they may not have an articulated vision of
“social good”, many data scientists are eager to apply
⑭ Some might argue that the order of Stages 1 and 2 should be reversed:
data scientists should reflect first, then act to address social issues. This
would be the most responsible approach and is the practice that data
scientists should follow in the long term. In my experience, however, data
scientists’ engagements with politics tend to begin with an interest in
addressing social challenges, which then leads to reflection on the politics
of data science. New pedagogical approaches could merge these two
stages. For instance, a “public interest tech” program could integrate
reflection on the political nature of data science into its efforts to apply
data science in practice.
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their work to pressing societal challenges.
However, relative to the excitement around such work,
there is a dearth of opportunities for data scientists to
apply their skills to an articulated vision of social benefit.
Many academic departments and conferences tend not to
consider such work to be valid research, companies can
find more profit elsewhere, and governments and nonprofits have few internal data science roles. Thus, many
data scientists who want to do socially impactful work
often settle for more traditional research or jobs, in which
technical contributions and profit provide the primary
imperatives.
Data science programs should work towards a model
of “public interest technology” that trains data scientists
to address social issues. This involves not simply
adopting this label, but also providing methods,
pathways, and a broader culture of support for data
scientists to improve society. For example, data science
programs should develop clinics where students provide
technical and policy assistance to “clients” such as
activists and government agencies. Programs should
also provide funding and guidance for students to find
internships and jobs focused on social impact.⑮
It is essential that “social good” and “public interest
tech” programs prioritize social and political reforms
over deploying technology. The driving goal should be
to positively impact society rather than to develop
sophisticated tools. This requires an attitude of
agnosticism: “approaching algorithms instrumentally,
recognizing them as just one type of intervention, one
that cannot provide the solution to every problem”[68].
The more that data scientists work directly with
governments, communities, and service providers
(rather than on abstract technology problems), the more
thoroughly they will come to see technology as an
imperfect means rather than as an end in itself. Without
this technology-agnostic focus on social impacts, efforts
to apply data science to social problems will reproduce
the issues described in Section 2.3 and will prevent
progression to the following stages.

issues. To the extent that they maintain an open-minded
and critical approach grounded in impact, data scientists
will begin to reflect on political questions.
We have seen this process play out most clearly with
respect to algorithmic bias and fairness. Where just
a few years ago it was common to hear claims
that data represents “facts” and that algorithms are
“objective” [69, 70], today it is widely acknowledged
within data science that data contains biases and that
algorithms can discriminate. In addition to the annual
ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and
Transparency (FAccT), there have been numerous
workshops dedicated to these issues at major computer
science conferences[71]. Moreover, there is also an
emerging literature that articulates the limitations and
politics of common approaches to studying and
promoting algorithmic fairness[72−74].
Over time, data scientists must expand this critical and
reflexive lens to increasingly interrogate how all aspects
of their work are political. For example, returning to the
discussion of predictive policing from Section 2.2, it is
not sufficient to develop algorithms just with a
recognition that crime data are biased. It is necessary to
also recognize that our definitions of crime, the set of
institutions that are tasked with responding to it, and the
interventions that those institutions provide are all the
result of historical political processes laden with
discrimination.
Reflection of this sort is propelled by approaching
research with an open mind and honoring the expertise
of other disciplines, policymakers, and affected
communities. Such reflection will be particularly
enhanced by fluency in fields such as STS and critical
algorithm studies. Exposure to these fields should
become central to data science training programs,
particularly those with an emphasis on applications of
data science for social good. For data scientists hoping
to improve society, familiarity with STS and related
fields is just as essential as knowledge of databases and
statistics.

3.2

3.3

Stage 2: Reflection

As they work on data science for social good projects,
data scientists will encounter the political nature of both
the issues at hand and their own efforts to address these
⑮ See e.g., a list of job boards and other resources that I have compiled:
https: //www.benzevgreen.com/jobs/.

Stage 3: Applications

In the short term, the insights provided in Stage 2 are not
likely to shake the fundamental structures and practices
of data science. Instead, these insights will empower data
scientists to seek new applications for how existing data
science methods can address injustice and shift power.
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These effects will demonstrate how incorporating a
political perspective into data science produces new
directions for research and applications rather than a
dead end.
Several frameworks can guide data scientists in these
efforts. For example, André Gorz’s schema of nonreformist reforms and the framework of prison abolition
provide conceptual tools for moving beyond the false
dichotomy between incremental and radical
reform[61, 64]. The notion of “critical design” embodies
a similar approach: in contrast to “affirmative design,
which “reinforces how things are now”, “critical design
provides a critique of how things are now through
designs that embody alternative social, cultural,
technical, or economic values”[75]. A related framework
is “anti-oppressive design”, which provides “a guide for
how best to expend resources, be it the choice of a
research topic, the focus of a new social enterprise, or the
selection of clients and projects, rather than relying on
vague intentions or received wisdom about what
constitutes good”[76].
At each stage of the research and design process, data
scientists should evaluate their efforts according to these
frameworks: Should the design of this algorithm be
affirmative or critical? Would the implementation of this
model represent a reformist or non-reformist reform?
Would empowering our project partner with this system
challenge or entrench oppression? Such analyses can
help data scientists interrogate their notions of “good” to
engage in non-reformist, critical, and anti-oppressive
data science. These approaches can also help data
scientists recognize situations in which nontechnological reforms are more desirable than
technological ones[37, 77].
This ethos of pursuing different, politically motivated
data science applications can inform work in areas such
as policing. One dimension of this shift involves a
critical and anti-oppressive approach to selecting project
partners. For example, some researchers explicitly
articulate an intention to work with community groups
and social service providers rather than with law
enforcement, recognizing that the latter tend to
contribute to structural oppression[55, 78, 79]. Another
dimension of this shift involves orienting the analytic
gaze away from individuals and towards institutions.
One example of this work used machine learning to
predict which police officers will be involved in adverse
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events such as racial profiling or inappropriate use of
force[56]. Others have used new algorithmic methods to
find evidence of racial bias in police behavior[80, 81].
Although Stage 3 represents a significant evolution of
data science toward politics, it suffers from three notable
shortcomings. First, it is possible to operate in Stage 3
without ever articulating an explicit politics. Although
not raising a project’s political motivations may enable
some projects to pass without scrutiny, it does little to
provide language or direction for other data scientists.
The field will not evolve if political debates remain
shrouded. Moreover, only relatively minor reforms
could be successfully promoted in this covert manner:
more significant reforms will likely be challenged and
will advance only if they can be explicitly defended.
Second, existing data science methods have a limited
ability to promote social justice. Because of data science’s
adherence to mathematical formalism, current methods
are incapable of rigorously representing and reasoning
about social contexts and political impacts[68]. Thus,
even well-intentioned and seemingly well-designed data
science tools can promote injustice[74].
Third, merely directing data science toward new
applications remains fundamentally undemocratic: it
allows data scientists to shape society without
deliberation or accountability. In this frame, a cadre of
data scientists—no matter their intentions or
actions—retain an outsized power to shape institutions
and decision-making processes. Even when their actions
are grounded in anti-oppressive ideals, the efforts of data
scientists can serve coercive functions if they are not
grounded in the needs and desires of the communities
supposedly being served. In order to promote long-term
structural change and social justice, larger shifts in data
science practice are necessary.
3.4

Stage 4: Practice

The final stage is to develop new modes for what it
means to practice data science. Achieving changes along
these lines requires developing new epistemologies,
methodologies, and cultures for data science. While the
path ahead remains somewhat speculative, several broad
directions are clear.
3.4.1 Participatory data science
Data scientists must abandon their desire for a removed
objectivity in favor of participation and deliberation
among diverse perspectives. STS scholar Donna
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Haraway argues for a new approach centered on
“situated knowledges”: she articulates the need “for a
doctrine and practice of objectivity that privileges
contestation and deconstruction”, one that recognizes
that every claim emerges from the perspective of a
particular person or group of people[41]. Following this
logic, the “neutral” data scientist who attempts to
minimize position-taking must be replaced by a data
science of situated values—a “participatory
counterculture of data science”[82]. This perspective
highlights the importance of groups such as Black in
AI,⑯ LatinX in AI,⑰ Queer in AI,⑱ and Women in
Machine Learning,⑲ all of which work to increase the
presence of underrepresented groups in the field of
artificial intelligence. Given that data science is
influenced by practitioners’ perceptions of problems and
of how to address them, it is essential to encourage
greater diversity in data science[83].
Complementing this participatory approach is for data
science to focus more directly on “designing with” rather
than “designing for” affected communities and social
movements. Data scientists must develop procedures for
incorporating a multitude of public voices into their
work. When engineers privilege their own perspectives
and fail to consider the multiplicity of needs and values
across society, they tend to erase and subjugate those
who are already marginalized[84−90]. To avoid
participating in these oppressive (even if inadvertent)
acts, data scientists must center affected communities in
their work. One approach toward this end is the principle
of “Nothing about us without us”, which has been
invoked in numerous social movements (in particular,
among disability rights activists in the 1990s) to signify
that no policies should be developed without direct
participation from the people most directly affected by
those policies[91]. The Design Justice Network
articulates a powerful enactment of these values, with its
commitments to “center the voices of those who are
directly impacted” and to “look for what is already
working at the community level”[92].
This type of approach represents a notable departure
from traditional data science practice and
values—efficiency
and
convenience—toward
⑯ https: //blackinai.github.io/
⑰ http://www.latinxinai.org/
⑱ https: //sites.google.com/view/queer-in-ai/
⑲ https: //wimlworkshop.org
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democracy and empowerment. A great deal of work in
recent years has exemplified this approach[79, 93−100].
Mechanisms for participatory design and decision
making—such as charrettes, participatory budgeting,
and co-production—present further models of designing
with communities. Any participatory practices should
entail not just the design of an algorithm, but also broader
questions such as whether an algorithm should be
developed in the first place and how it should be used.
Additionally, an essential component of developing a
more democratic data science is to bring data scientists,
technology companies, and governments within the
ambit of democratic oversight and accountability[101].
3.4.2 New methods and cultures
Adapting data science to a political orientation and to
participatory practices will require new methods.
Broadly speaking, data science must move toward a
“critical technical practice” that rejects “the false
precision of mathematical formalism” to engage with the
political world in its full complexity and ambiguity[102].
It is necessary to expand the bounds of algorithmic
reasoning, shifting from the dominant method of
“algorithmic formalism” to the alternative method of
“algorithmic realism” that better accounts for the
realities of social life and the impacts of algorithmic
interventions[68].
As a central component of this evolution, the field
should change its internal structures to incentivize
greater attention to the implementation and impacts of
data science. To embrace justice and tackle the most
pressing social issues related to algorithms, data science
must take a more expansive approach to research
contributions that looks for more than technical
contributions. Actually improving people’s lives with
data science requires far more than just developing a
technical tool—it also requires thoughtfully adapting
data science methods to the needs of a particular
organization or community[37]. If data scientists are to
contribute to improving society, they need a more
rigorous methodology for ensuring that data science
tools produce beneficial impacts when implemented in
real-world contexts. New workshops, conferences, and
journals will be essential mechanisms for fostering novel
methods that blend technical and nontechnical
approaches.
Along these lines, data scientists must also adopt a
reflexive political standpoint that grounds their efforts in
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rigorous evaluations of downstream social and political
consequences. What ultimately matters is not how an
algorithm performs in the abstract, but what impacts an
algorithm has when introduced into complex
sociopolitical environments. Data scientists cannot be
expected to perfectly predict the impacts of their work—
the entanglements between technology and society are
far too complex. However, through collaborations with
communities and with scholars from other fields, wellgrounded analyses are possible. Just as data scientists
would demand rigor in claims that one algorithm is
superior to another, they should also demand rigor in
claims that a technology will have any particular impacts.
Toward this end, one necessary direction for future
research is to develop interdisciplinary frameworks that
will help data scientists consider the downstream
impacts of their interventions. This requires being
mindful of the various forms of “indeterminacy” that
may lead an algorithm to generate different impacts than
its developers expect[68].
As one example of a reform that emphasizes impacts
as a central concern, in 2018 the ACM Future of
Computing Academy proposed that peer reviewers
should consider the potential negative implications of
submitted work and that conducting “anti-social
research” should factor negatively into promotion and
tenure cases[103]. Just two years later, the Neural
Information
Processing
Systems
Conference
(NeurIPS)—one
of
the
world’s
top
AI
conferences—announced that every paper at the 2020
conference must include a “broader impact” section that
discusses the positive and negative social consequences
of the research[104].
3.4.3 Engaging with the broader political context
Of course, shifts in data science practice do not occur in
a vacuum. Shifts in data science practice require broader
structural reforms that contribute to a more just society.
As historian Elizabeth Fee notes, “we can expect a sexist
society to develop a sexist science; equally, we can
expect a feminist society to develop a feminist
science”[105]. Similarly, we can expect a militarized
society of economic inequality to produce a militarized
and unequal data science[106, 107].
Data scientists committed to social justice must work
toward more structural reforms against the harms of
digital technologies. For instance, building solidarity
and power among workers can shift the development of
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data science away from the most harmful applications.
In recent years, tech workers have organized against
their companies’ partnerships with the United States
Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. Rather
than perceiving themselves as “just an engineer”, these
technologists recognize their position within larger
sociotechnical systems, recognize the connection
between their work and its social ramifications, and hold
themselves (and their companies) accountable for these
impacts. Building on this movement, thousands of
computer science students from more than a dozen US
universities pledged in 2019 that they will not work for
Palantir due to its partnerships with Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE)[108]. Data scientists should
also provide support for communities and activists
organizing in opposition to oppressive algorithms.
Data scientists alone cannot be held responsible for
promoting social and political progress. They are just
one set of actors among many. The task of data scientists
is not to eradicate social challenges on their own, but to
act as thoughtful and productive partners in broad
coalitions and social movements striving for a more just
society.

4

Conclusion

The field of data science must abandon its selfconception of being neutral to recognize how, despite
not being engaged in what is typically seen as political
activity, data science logics, methods, and technologies
shape society. Restructuring the values and practices of
data science around a political vision of social justice
will not be easy or immediate, but it is necessary. Given
the political stakes of algorithms, it is not enough to have
good intentions—data scientists must ground their
efforts in clear political commitments and rigorous
evaluations of the consequences.
As a form of political action, data science can no
longer be separated from broader analyses of social
structures, public policies, and social movements.
Instead, the field must debate what impacts are desirable
and how to promote those outcomes—thus prompting
rigorous evaluations of the issues at hand and openness
to the possibility of non-technological alternatives. Such
deliberation needs to occur not just among data scientists,
but also with scholars from other fields, policymakers,
and communities affected by data science systems.
Recognizing data science as a form of political action
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will empower and enlighten data scientists with new
frameworks to improve society. By deliberating about
political goals and strategies and by developing new
methods and norms, data scientists can more rigorously
contribute to social justice.
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